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We consider a model of international trade with increasing returns in a non-
traded input into industry, “infrastructure”, and show that the nature of equilibrium 
depends crucially on whether the infrastructure provider acts in a “naïve” manner – 
akin to a Level 1 agent in a cognitive hierarchy (C-H) model – or in a more 
sophisticated manner.   Infrastructure requires a fixed investment and is produced 
under decreasing marginal costs, and we model two possible market forms, monopoly 
and Cournot oligopoly with free entry – both capable of generating pecuniary 
externalities in the manufacturing sector .  Unlike most other work exploring the 
theme of increasing returns, we derive a unique closed economy equilibrium.  In a 
small open economy, we show that with “naïve” infrastructure provider(s), multiple 
equilibria obtain.  In this event whether or not a small open economy becomes an 
industrial exporter depends crucially on the presence of unexhausted economies of 
scale, and it is possible to have equilibria where manufactures are exported in spite of 
the world price of manufactures being lower than the autarky price.  With a more 
sophisticated infrastructure provider, however, even an open economy has a unique 
equilibrium, which for a wide range of parameter values also involves a greater 
degree of industrialization than any of the “naïve” equilibria.   For some parameter 
values, however, neither infrastructure nor manufacturing can develop and the 
economy remains totally agrarian.    
 
JEL classification : F1, O1. 
 
Keywords : Increasing returns to scale,  cognitive hierarchy,  multiple equilibria,  
uniqueness, Cournot oligopoly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
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 What factors determine whether a country becomes an industrial exporter, or 
remains primarily agrarian? Even within the subset of industrial exporters, can non-
policy factors influence the extent of trade, potentially driving apart economies with 
similar underlying parameters?  In this paper, we hope to shed light on these issues by 
examining a model of trade which synthesizes increasing returns in the non-traded 
input to industry – “infrastructure”- with an analysis of how the effect of openness 
varies drastically depending on whether the infrastructure provider(s) act like Level-1 
“naïve” agents in cognitive hierarchy (C-H) models, or in a more sophisticated 
manner.  Thus we use a somewhat unorthodox angle to deliver new insights on the 
role of trade as an engine of structural transformation in the presence of scale 
economies. 
 
Guha (1981) showed how economies of scale in manufacturing may, in the 
presence of transport costs, create insuperable barriers to the industrialization of a 
poor economy. Producers located in the poor country cannot achieve economies of 
scale on the basis of domestic demand; and, if they seek to do so by export, they run 
into high distribution costs. They are unable therefore to compete with rivals based in 
rich markets abroad and may not even be able to hold their own at home.   
 
However, if scale economies are sufficiently strong, multiple equilibria may 
emerge:  a Great Leap Forward in industrialization may then justify itself in the world 
market, a possibility that a closed economy would have precluded. 
 
All this, of course, echoes a familiar theme in development literature, dating back 
at least to the poverty traps of Rosenstein Rodan (1943) or even earlier, to Allyn 
Young (1928), a theme that has been revived more recently by Murphy et al (1987).  
While Murphy et al looked at scale economies and multiple equilibria in a closed 
economy, later literature dealt with openness as well.  The decade of the nineties has 
seen contributions from Krugman (1991),  Rodriguez-Clare (1996), Venables (1996), 
Duranton (1998) and Puga and Venables (1999) among others.  Krugman (1991) has 
rigorously modeled a similar theme in terms of the multiple equilibria of a general 
equilibrium system with competitive agriculture and monopolistically competitive 
manufactures producing differentiated products (which enter into Dixit-Stiglitz 
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consumer utility functions) under increasing returns. Krugman assumes perfect 
mobility of industrial labor between the different markets. Puga and Venables (1999) 
retain the traditional trade theory assumption of labor immobility: further, their 
differentiated manufactures are not just final consumer goods which enter utility 
functions but also intermediates that enter CES production functions for each other a 
la  Ethier (1982). In both these models, food is perfectly mobile and all produced 
goods are tradable (though with iceberg transport costs). 
 
We depart from product differentiation as a source of increasing returns to scale, 
and choose instead to focus on the role of infrastructural inputs to industry.  Thus we 
deal with a variety of scale economies that is very important in the less developed 
world : infrastructural economies associated with power plants, roads, railways, 
communication networks etc.  We also do not use the Ethier production function.  
Our choice reflects the fact that in the Ethier production function increasing returns 
stem from an increase in the number of intermediates - all close substitutes of each 
other - in actual use (as against the number available). It is not clear why a large 
number of closely substitutable inputs should be simultaneously employed.  
Moreover, infrastructural intermediates are mostly mutually non-substitutable as well 
as non-tradable.  
 
Manufacturing dominated by such infrastructural factors is characterized by scale 
economies that are external to the firm but internal to the manufacturing sector as a 
whole.  The final product industries in such a system could well be competitive;  and 
there is a long tradition in international trade literature from R. C. O. Matthews 
(1950) to Herberg and Kemp (1969) to Panagariya (1981) (MHKP) of competitive 
general equilibrium models with an increasing return industry.  A problem with most 
of these constructs arises from the fact that the source of increasing returns is never 
explicitly modeled.  In the real world, external economies in manufacturing may arise 
from two sources – (1) through irreversible learning processes a la Arrow (eg. the 
growth through learning-by-doing of a skilled labor force or the cross-fertilization of 
research), (2) the fall in prices of intermediate inputs as supplier industries grow and 
realize internal economies of scale.  The MHKP models are static with reversible 
scale economies:  they cannot accommodate learning by doing.  Nor do they have 
room for a third intermediate sector which uses resources under internal economies of 
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scale.  Thus the external economies in these models appear out of nowhere like 
manna from heaven.  This has the advantage that competitive assumptions can be 
applied to the whole economy and production equilibrium necessarily occurs on the 
production possibility curve (rather than inside it) – but it detracts severely from 
realism.  In contrast, we explicitly model an infrastructural sector with internal 
economies of scale, capable of generating pecuniary externalities in manufacturing.  
We model two possible market forms for this sector – monopoly and Cournot 
oligopoly. 
 
Some papers in the literature have indeed attempted to introduce an intermediate 
good responsible for external economies in a final goods sector.  These include 
Venables (1996) in which the relevant intermediate is a tradable input, and Okuno-
Fujiwara (1988) in which the intermediate is not traded.  Interestingly, our findings 
depart from these, as well as from other papers dealing with increasing returns, in 
several key aspects.  In spite of the presence of increasing returns, we find that the 
closed economy equilibrium is unique.  This contrasts with the findings of others. We 
also find that opening up the economy may give rise to multiple equilibria if the 
infrastructure provider is “naïve” (in a manner to be clarified shortly) but unlike 
Okuno-Fujiwara, these equilibria need not involve complete specialization.  Some of 
these multiple equilibria may involve manufactures being exported even if the world 
price of manufactures is lower than the autarky price. For some parameter ranges, 
there can only be a unique equilibrium, a purely agrarian one.  If the infrastructure 
provider(s) is (are) “sophisticated”, however, not behaving in accordance with Level 
1 reasoning in C-H models, we find a unique open economy equilibrium, which, for a 
wide range of parameter values, involves more industrialization than do any of the 
“naïve” equilibria.  Moreover, to our knowledge, none of the other papers have 
attempted to model the infrastructure provider as a monopolist operating a natural 
monopoly.  Our focus on the extent of rationality and on equilibrium versus cognitive 
hierarchy type reasoning by the infrastructure provider(s) is also not a feature of these 
other models. 
 
This brings us to another strand of the literature relevant to our paper.  A recent 
body of literature has developed “cognitive hierarchy” models.  Some examples 
include Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004), Crawford (2004) and Crawford and Iriberri 
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(2005).  These papers argue that agents do not always reason the way equilibrium 
models posit they do.  They instead form an often simplistic assumption about the 
behavior of other players, and play their best response given this assumption.  They 
categorize agents according to “levels” where a “Level-k” agent assumes that other 
agents are at the level k-1 and plays his best response to type k-1.  A “level zero” 
agent either behaves “randomly” or follows a (non-optimizing) rule while a “Level 1” 
agent in these models optimizes assuming that other agents are level zero.  The 
rationale underlying these models is that experimental evidence has shown that most 
agents do not reason in the complex and sophisticated manner suggested by 
equilibrium analysis1.  In our paper, we adapt ideas from this body of work to 
incorporate them into our particular context.   
 
Before going on to our model, we briefly discuss our modeling of infrastructure. 
In the literature, infrastructure has been modeled in two distinct ways.  In the older 
tradition of Arrow – Kurz (1970) and Barro (1990), it is visualized as an input in the 
production process, an input that could be either appropriable or non-appropriable.  
More recently, Martin and Rogers (1995) have examined it as the determinant of the 
proportion of output that evaporates before reaching the consumer;  in their 
formulation, it is essentially a public good supplied by the state.  Infrastructure is 
indeed heterogeneous in the extreme, ranging from electricity on the one hand to the 
legal and administrative machinery on the other. Our focus however is on 
infrastructural services as private goods;  we wish to examine the part they play in the 
frequent failure of market processes to generate growth without assuming the 
problem away by assigning an indispensable role to the state in their provision.  We 
revert therefore to the Arrow-Barro tradition in which infrastructural services enter 
the production function.  We assume in addition that they are private goods:  the basic 
model is that of electricity, frequently identified in many poor countries (such as 
India) as the critical bottleneck on growth.  This does not mean that they are 
necessarily provided by the private sector;  indeed, in a later section, we compare 
public supply of infrastructural services with private monopoly.   
 
What are the distinctive implications of infrastructure in such a context?  We 
stress two. 
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First, infrastructure requires fixed investment, which occurs only if the rate of 
return on this fixed cost at least matches the rate of interest.  Thus the possibility 
exists of a low-level equilibrium without infrastructure and therefore without 
industry, a pure agrarian economy which must import all its manufactures. 
 
Secondly, the non-tradable character of infrastructural services ensures that the 
scale economies they generate are localized.  In models with increasing returns in the 
final goods industry (whether arising from direct increase in output or from increase 
in the number of intermediates in use), one must postulate transport costs of tradable 
goods to localize scale economies in a particular country.  One must also explain how 
differences in scales arise by postulating differences in consumption patterns between 
countries (due to factors like population size or Engel effects on the demand for 
manufactures).  Though our model accommodates both transport costs on final 
products and Engel effects, its results are independent of these assumptions.  Thus, its 
conclusions are not undermined by the secular decline in the share of transport costs 
in world prices.  
 
In section 2, we set up our model. We derive results for the closed economy in 
section 3 and for a small open economy in section 4. In section 5 we discuss how our 
results change if the infrastructure provider acts in a more sophisticated manner than 
“Level 1” agents in cognitive hierarchy models. In section 6 we consider the case of 
public ownership of infrastructure, while in section 7 we show that our results 
generalize to the Cournot oligopoly case. Section 8 concludes with a discussion of 
some implications.      
     
 
2. The Model 
 
Our model has two final products, food and manufactures produced under 
constant returns to scale and one intermediate, infrastructural services, produced 
under increasing returns. Agriculture uses labor and the fixed endowment of land to 
produce food.   Infrastructural services are provided by labor operating fixed 
equipment under decreasing marginal cost; this equipment is indivisible, it costs a 
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fixed amount F and is imported.  Manufactures are produced using labor and 
infrastructural services under CRS. 
 
Investment in infrastructure is financed by free mobility of capital at the fixed 
world interest rate r. 
 
Internal economies of scale in the infrastructural activity rule out perfect 
competition: we assume that the industry is a natural monopoly.  The rest of the 
economy is competitive.  While the infrastructure monopolist2 is the sole supplier of 
his product, he must compete in the labor market with all other manufacturers and 
with farmers.   
 
For the rest of this section as well as for sections 3 and 4, we consider the 
possibility that the infrastructure monopolist behaves in a “naïve” manner, which we 
argue is similar to the behavior of Level 1 agents in C-H models. Specifically, the 
monopolist takes wages and the manufacturer’s employment choices as given.  He 
does not recognize his potential leadership role – the fact that his production 
decisions will affect the demand for labor (and the wage rate), both directly through 
their impact on infrastructural employment and indirectly through their induced 
effects on manufacturing employment. 
 
Why is this similar to a Level 1 C-H agent? Standard equilibrium reasoning by 
the infrastructure monopolist would lead him to recognize and take into account his 
leadership role.  Just as a Level 1 agent plays his best response assuming that other 
agents are not playing in their best interest (but instead following a simple rule, or 
randomizing), the infrastructure monopolist fails to take into account the fact that 
manufacturers will best-respond to his own employment decisions while setting their 
employment levels.  Although he does not assume random behavior on their part, he 
does underestimate their capacity to act in an optimal fashion. In a later section, we 
analyze the consequences of allowing the infrastructure provider to behave in a more 
“sophisticated” manner in line with Stackelberg models.  We note at this point that as 
we consider a static game, there is no scope for analyzing learning behavior.  
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The infrastructural service is non-tradeable while food and manufactures are 
perfectly mobile in international trade. 
 
We eliminate distributional considerations by assuming Stone-Geary utility functions 
with a subsistence term for food, implying linear expenditure functions. 
 
2.2 Infrastructure Monopoly 
 
We assume Cobb-Douglas production functions 
1
aA L N
α α−=                                                                     (1) 
for food and 
M 1mL I
β β−=                                                                              (2) 
for manufactures where L  and L  are labor inputs in the two sectors, N is the fixed 
endowment of land and I the infrastructural service. Infrastructure requires a lumpy 
investment, F. The production function for the latter is iso-elastic in labor, once the 
initial investment F is made: 
a m
iI L
δ= , δ  > 1                                                 (3) 
where L i  is the labour input in the infrastructural activity. Such a production function 
could result, for instance, from the division of labor as the output of the infrastructure 
service increases.  We can choose the unit of land so that N = 1. 
  
 The utility function is 
U = 1( )d dM A A
μ μ−−                                                                (4) 
where M  and A  are the consumptions of manufactures and food respectively 
implies that expenditure on manufactures is a fixed fraction 
d d
μ  of the surplus of 
income over  subsistence A  : 
(d )pM pM Aμ= + − A                                                          (5) 
 where p is the price of manufactures in terms of food.  
Labor market equilibrium requires that the wage rate 
1
aw L
αα −=                                                                                 (6) 
1( / )mp L I
ββ −=                                                                        (7) 
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Labor is supplied inelastically  and the wage-rate adjusts flexibly to ensure full 
employment. 
La + Lm + Li = L                                                                      (8) 
The price q of the infrastructural service is its marginal value product in 
manufacturing 
(1 ) ( / )mq p L I
ββ= −                                                               (9) 
 
We consider pure monopoly in the infrastructural activity. The inverse demand 
function for the monopolist's product is represented by (9).  Following Venables 
(1996), we let the infrastructure producer presume that manufacturers typically 
commit themselves to employment contracts first;  subsequently, they decide on their 
output and buy infrastructural services in the light of the price that clears the market 
for the latter.  Thus, the monopolist takes the manufacturer’s employment level as 
given when figuring out the derived demand for his product.  He then perceives the 
elasticity of this demand as 1/ β  so that the profit-maximizing equality of the 
monopolist's marginal revenue and marginal cost would require 
(1 ) ( ) /iq wL Iβ− = ∂ ∂                                                  (10) 
= w ∂ I 1/δ / ∂ I                                                               (11) 
= (1 1/ ) /wI δ δ− −                                                              (12) 
subject of course to the condition that profits are non-negative: 
1/qI wI δ≥ + rF                                                           (13). 
A necessary condition for this is 
q > wI-(1-1/δ)                                                                                   (14). 
(11) and (13) together imply 
1/δ > 1 – β                                                                (15). 
(15) also happens to be the second order condition for the monopolist’s maximization 
exercise – which is thus subsumed in the condition for non-negative profits. 
For the present, we assume that (13) is satisfied, so that the fixed cost rF can be 
ignored, as it is in the short run. 
      Simple manipulations now yield 
I = (β/δ(1-β)2 )-βδ/σ Mδ/σ                                               (16) 
 10
where σ = β + (1 – β)δ is a weighted average of δ and 1 and therefore larger than 
unity. Manufactured output and infrastructural services are, not  surprisingly, 
increasing functions of each other. 
            Further, we have 
1/ 1[w L M σ αα λ ] −= −                                                      (17) 
where 
2
/
2
(1 ){1 }{ }
(1 )
β σβ δ βλ δ β β
−= + − . 
The wage rate rises as manufactures expand - since the growth of manufacturing 
diverts labor both directly and indirectly (through the expansion of infrastructural 
activity that it induces) from agriculture, thus raising the marginal productivity of 
labor in terms of food. 
 
However, there are increasing returns to infrastructural activity, so that q, the 
price of the infrastructural service, is subject to two conflicting forces as 
manufacturing and infrastructure grow - the upward pressure of rising wages and the 
down-thrust of economies of scale (indicated by the negative exponent of I in (12)). 
When the industrial sector is small, the latter dominates and infrastructure cheapens 
as it expands. The effect may well be reversed in an industrialized economy. 
 
The unit cost of manufacturing in turn may increase or diminish with 
manufactured output according to the balance between economies of scale in the 
production of infrastructural inputs and wage pressures. Some cumbrous but simple 
algebraic manipulation yields 
p = w/τM1-1/σ                                                    (18). 
where 2 (1 ) / /{ (1 ) }δ β σ β στ δ β β−= −  
As  (and ), w converges to the non-zero limit 0M → aL → L 1Lαα −  and p to . On 
the other hand, as  and M to the finite maximum that this implies, w and p 
both tend to .  The inverse supply function of manufactures p = 
∞
0aL →
∞ ϕ (M) appears to 
be U-shaped, a conjecture that is confirmed by differentiation, yielding 
/dp p = 1 1{ ( ) } /a
a
L L dM M
L
α σ
σ σ
−− −−                      (19) 
Thus, '( ) / ( )M M Mϕ ϕ ≤    0 or '( ) / ( )M M Mϕ ϕ ≥0 as 
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( ) /a aL L L− ) ≤    ( 1) /(1σ α− −   or  ( ) /a aL L L− ≥ ( 1) /(1 )σ α− −            (20) 
As the economy industrializes, the share of industrial to agricultural labor rises from 
0 to , ensuring a unique minimum to the supply curve of manufactures. External 
economies of scale continue to dominate manufacturing till the share of agriculture in 
the labor force dwindles to 
∞
(1 ) /( )α σ α− − . Thereafter they are swamped by wage 
pressures. 
  
 Further, equation (19) indicates that  
0 '( ) / ( ) (1 1/ )M M M 1ϕ ϕ σ> > − − > −                          (21). 
 
So much for the domestic supply of manufactures. What of the domestic demand ?   
Inserting the agricultural production function in (5), we have  
(d )apM pM L
αμ A= + −                                          (22). 
If we substitute for  in terms of M, we would have the implicit domestic demand  
for manufactures as a function of domestic supply:   
aL
Md = μ[M+{(L-λM1/σ )α – Ā}/φ(M)] = θ(M)                      (23) 
for p  ≥ p, the minimum supply price of manufactures and     
Md = μ(Lα– Ā)/p                                                      (23a) 
 for   p < p. 
 
 
 
 
3. The Closed Economy 
 
       A solution of the equation M = Md = θ(M) is a closed economy equilibrium.  
Proposition 1: The closed economy equilibrium exists and is unique. 
Proof: In the appendix. 
 
This is illustrated graphically in Figs.1 and 2.  The upper part of each diagram 
shows ψ(M), the supply price of manufactures, as a function of the output M.  Any 
output M determines a price ψ(M), which, together with M, determines domestic 
demand Md.  The supply curve of manufactures is depicted by a U-shaped curve in the 
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upper part of the figure.  In the lower part, however, domestic demand for 
manufactures is plotted against the output and represented as θ(M).  We prove in the 
appendix that θ(M) starts on the left of the 45˚ line and ends on its right, so that it must 
cross the latter;  We also prove that only one intersection is possible – at U 
corresponding to P in the top quadrant, where supply and demand for manufactures 
are equal at the price PT.  Q is the minimum point of the curve ψ(M) and QN the 
corresponding minimum supply price of manufactures.  Since ψ(M) is U-shaped, any 
price above QN is associated with two possible outputs and therefore with two 
possible demands for manufactures, one corresponding to each output.  At prices 
below QN, no manufactures are produced; a demand for manufactures arises out of 
agricultural surplus over subsistence. 
 
However, θ(M) can intersect the 45˚ line either to the left of the minimum 
point of the supply curve (as in Fig. 1) or to its right (as in Fig. 2).  Autarky 
equilibrium might occur with unexhausted economies of scale  or it may occur on the 
rising segment of the supply curve. 
 
Some simple substitutions show that if  Ā = 0 (there are no subsistence 
requirements), autarky equilibrium occurs when the ratio of non-agricultural to 
agricultural labor reaches  μ{δ(1−β)2 + β}/α(1−μ).  If the subsistence term is 
positive, the share of non-agriculture in the labor force would be larger than this 
under autarky.  However, it is significant that nothing much changes if we dispense 
with the subsistence requirement with its non-homotheticity implications.  Our model 
accommodates differential income-elasticities of demand , but is not driven by them. 
 
Autarky equilibrium will occur with unexhausted economies of scale if the 
relative share of industry to agriculture in the labor force is smaller under autarky 
than at the minimum point of the supply curve of manufactures.  A sufficient 
condition is  μ{δ(1−β)2 + β}/α(1−μ) < (σ−1)/(1−α).  The smaller is μ, the budget 
share of manufactures in the consumer’s surplus income over subsistence, and the 
larger is α, the elasticity of labor supply to the industrial sector,  the likelier it is that 
this condition will be met.  However, even if the condition is unfulfilled, a large 
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enough subsistence requirement Ā can result in an autarky equilibrium on the down-
sloping segment of the supply curve of manufactures.  
 
 
4. The Small Open Economy 
 
 In a small open economy, the system of equations can no longer be closed by 
equating Md to M, but by taking p as exogenously determined by the world market. 
Because of the U-shape of the supply curve, our system generates multiple equilibria 
when opened up to trade.  We maintain the assumption in this section that the 
infrastructure monopolist is “naïve”. 
  
 There are two possible cases here, depending on whether autarky equilibrium 
exhausts or does not exhaust economies of scale;  the parameter space within which 
each of these cases holds has already been discussed.  Further, each case can be 
partitioned into two subcases according to whether the world price p̃ (ignoring 
transport costs for the present) exceeds the autarky price p* or falls short of it. 
 
1. In case 1, autarky equilibrium occurs in the decreasing return phase of the 
supply curve (Fig. 2).  Now, 
(a) if  p < p̃ < p* (the world price lies between the autarky price and the 
minimum supply price just like the price OE), there will be excess demand 
for, and imports of, manufactures;  however, thanks to the U-shaped 
supply  curve, two such import equilibria will exist:  the price OE will just 
cover the cost of producing either the output EH or the smaller output EF;  
given the same price, the difference in output patterns will imply different 
income levels and therefore different domestic demand levels for 
manufactures;   
(b) if p̃ > p* (as with world price OV), this may generate a large 
manufactured output VZ, implying exports;  but it is also consistent with 
the smaller output VX and imports. 
2. In case 2, with increasing returns ruling in autarky equilibrium (Fig.1),  
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(a) if p < p̃ < p* (OE in Fig. 1), this could lead to either of the outputs EG or 
EI (with associated domestic demands that are both less than domestic 
supply), implying manufactured exports in either case; 
(b) if p̃ > p* (OV in Fig. 1), this may induce an output of VZ  with exports;  
but it could imply the smaller output VW and imports.  
 
Imperfect international mobility of goods does not change the picture in its 
essentials.  Assume that transport costs to and from the rest of the world absorb a 
fraction (1 – 1/ta) of food and (1 – 1/tm) of manufactures.  This defines a price band 
tatmp* > p > p*/tatm  around the autarky price p* within which autarky can be 
sustained.  If the world price were outside this band, arbitrage would erode autarky.  
Apart from the replacement of the single price p* by this price band, our analysis 
goes through unchanged. 
  
 Our economy therefore faces a multiplicity of possible equilibria at different 
levels of industrialization. Once however we relax the assumption that condition (13) 
is satisfied everywhere, several of these short run equilibria are no longer profitable 
in the long run. Recall that profits in the infrastructure monopoly 
π = qI – wI1/δ – rF.                                                           (24). 
Substitutions from (12) reduce this to 
π = wI1/δ[1/δ(1-β) – 1] – rF.                                            (25) 
If inequality (14) is not fulfilled, positive profits can never be made in the 
infrastructure activity, no investment will ever be made in infrastructure and the 
economy is doomed to remain permanently agricultural.  If however (14) is satisfied, 
profit becomes an increasing function of both wages and infrastructural services.  
Since both of these increase with manufactured output, so does profit.  The possibility 
now emerges of profits being negative at low levels of manufactured output, but  
positive at higher levels.  With a multiplicity of short run equilibria, the ones at 
higher output levels could well be sustainable even if those at lower levels are not.  
This underlines the “big-push” flavor of our open economy multiple equilibria model. 
We note that equilibria can be supported where manufactures are exported in spite of 
their autarky price exceeding the world price, provided economies of scale were 
unexhausted in autarky equilibrium : similarly, it is possible to support equilibria 
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where manufactures are imported in spite of the world price of manufactures being 
higher than the autarky price, if scale economies had been exhausted in autarky.   
  
The “naïve” equilibria described above point to the multiplicity of outcomes 
that could emerge in small open economies, potentially causing divergence of 
economies with similar underlying parameters.  This divergence could happen either 
if the infrastructure provider(s) in the different economies were all naïve, or 
alternatively if they were naïve in some but not in others.  We will show in the next 
section how the outcome differs for a “sophisticated” infrastructure provider, yielding 
a unique prediction for the open as well as for the closed economy. 
  
We show below that of all the “naïve” equilibria described, the equilibrium 
which yields the most profits for the infrastructure monopolist for any given set of 
parameters involves the greatest degree of industrialization – as profits are directly 
related to manufactured output.  However, as long as the infrastructure monopolist 
does not recognize his role as a “leader” there is no guarantee that co-ordination on 
this particular equilibrium will occur. In the next section, we will argue that a 
“sophisticated” Stackelberg-type monopolist will, for a wide range of parameters, 
choose an equilibrium with an even greater degree of industrialization than the most 
profitable of the “naïve” equilibria.  Thus, whether the monopolist behaves as a 
sophisticated agent in equilibrium models3, or as a level-1 agent in C-H models, can 
drastically affect whether the economy experiences successful industrialization. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
4.2 Profits, Wages and National Incomes in the Naïve Equilibria 
 
 We turn to a comparison of profit and wage levels in the trading equilibria and 
the autarky equilibrium in the naïve case. The competitive final goods industry of 
course converges to zero profit equilibria in all cases. Wage rates however differ - 
and so do profit levels in infrastructure monopoly. 
 
The wage equations - (7) or (17) - show wages to be an increasing function of 
manufactured output. The increased demand for labor as manufacturing expands 
drives up wages in terms of food. Equation (18) indicates that w/p, the product wage 
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in terms of manufactures, is also positively related to M. Wages in terms of both final 
goods will therefore be higher in (1) the industrial exporter than in the autarkic 
economy and (2) the autarkic economy than in the industrial importer. 
 
As for the profit level π  in the infrastructure monopoly, 
1/qI wI δπ = −  – rF.                                                           (26). 
Substitutions from (12) reduce this to 
1/ 1{
(1 )
wI δπ δ β= − 1}−  – rF                                              (27). 
The condition for non-negative profit (14) ensures that π  will be an increasing 
function of both w and I; and since both increase with manufactured output, so will 
the profit level. Industrialization necessarily increases profits in the infrastructure 
monopoly.  This holds good even if we measure profits in terms of manufactures 
rather than of food as in equation (25). Divide both sides of this equation by p: profits 
in terms of manufactures π /p will be seen to be an increasing function of I and the 
product wage in manufacturing w/p - both of which increase with industrialization. 
 
Since however the return to land diminishes with industrialization, we cannot 
indicate an unambiguous direction of change for national income or welfare. National 
income in terms of food 
Y = A + pM                                                                         (28). 
Differentiation and some manipulation yields 
(1 )/ [ { 1}
a
pMdY dM
wL
1]αστ λ −= − +                                      (29) 
Thus  as / 0dY dM ≥ / 1/(1 )[1 1/ ]apM wL α λ≥ − −               (30) 
or as / /(1 )[1 1/pM A ]α α≥ − − λ                                          (31). 
When manufactures account for a negligible fraction of total output, industrialization 
depresses national income in terms of food. However, as inequality (20) shows, the 
value of manufactured output rises with M, agricultural output falls - and, once the 
relative share of industry crosses the threshold indicated by (30), further 
industrialization adds to national income. 
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These results involve a comparison of various “naïve” equilibria and establish 
that, among these, the most highly industrialized generates the highest profits, the 
highest wages and, beyond a point, the highest national income.   
 
5. Sophistication and the Stackelberg Equilibrium 
 
 What if the monopolist plays the role of a full Stackelberg leader in factor, as 
well as product, markets?  A Stackelberg leader is defined here as a producer who is 
aware of and takes into account the impact of his decisions on the labor market and, 
through that, on the rest of the economy.  He believes, correctly, that other agents 
adjust their behavior to any given set of product and factor price-parameters, and 
best-respond to his own decisions : he maximizes his profits on the basis of this 
belief.  He therefore departs from the naïve reasoning that characterizes Level-1 
cognitive-hierarchy reasoning, and does not make the assumption, attributed to him in 
the earlier part of this paper, that manufacturers’ employment levels are given.  
 
Would sophisticated reasoning by the infrastructure monopolist necessarily 
involve an even higher degree of industrialization?  This cannot be established in 
general.  However, even without deriving a full Stackelberg equilibrium (which 
would involve an excursion into a forest of convoluted algebra), we can establish a 
sufficient, but by no means necessary, condition for Stackelberg behavior to result in 
increased industrial output:  in particular, a Stackelberg leader would certainly 
increase industrial output whenever the share of non-agricultural employment in the 
labor force is below a certain threshold. 
 
A Stackelberg leader would not accept (9) as the demand curve for his 
product.  He would instead maximize π, subject to equations (1) to (8).  Now 
π + rF  = qI – wLi
= (1 – β)pM – wLm. Li/Lm
= (1 – β)pM – βpM.Li/Lm
= pM{1 – β(1 + Li/Lm)}.                                           (32) 
A sufficient, but not necessary, condition for profits to be an increasing function of 
the value of manufactured output is that the relative share of non–agricultural to 
agricultural employment should lie below a minimum: 
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(Li + Lm)/La < (1 –β)(δ – 1)/(1 – α).                                      (33) 
For proof, use (1) – (3) and (6) – (8) to derive 
dw/w = (1 –α)(Li/δLa  dI/I + Lm/La  dLm/Lm)  and 
dw/w = (1 – β)(dI/I – dLm/Lm). 
Eliminating dw/w, we get 
dLm/Lm =  
(1 ) (1 ){(1 ) }
{ (1 ) (1 ) }
(1 ) (1 )
i
a m
a m
LL pM L pM
pM A
L L
β βδ β α α β
β α
− − + − − −− + −
− + −
Aα α
 
(34) 
  
Now, if  (Li + Lm)/La < (1 – β)(δ – 1)/(1 – α), a little manipulation yields 
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
a
a m
iL L
L L
δ β α
δ β α
− − −
− + −  > 1.                               (35) 
(35) has two implications.  First, since the denominator of the LHS is positive, the 
numerator must also be positive;  but then equation (34) ensures that dLm has the 
same sign as dI.  Further (34) and (35) together imply 
I/Lm  dLm/dI  > 1/δ 
i.e. > I/Li  dLi/dI                                                          (36) 
Inequality (36) implies that any increase in infrastructure and therefore in 
manufactured output (since the other input in manufacturing Lm grows with I) 
reduces the ratio of infrastructural to manufacturing employment Li/Lm.  It thus raises 
the coefficient of pM in equation (32).  Infrastructure profits (over variable cost) rise 
more than proportionally with manufactured output.  Thus, if condition (33) is 
fulfilled, a Stackelberg monopolist will necessarily expand output beyond any 
profitable position he may initially be at.   
 
6. Public Ownership of the Infrastructure Industry 
 
How would all this compare with the social optimum?  In particular, would 
the profit-maximizing monopolist aim at a higher degree of industrialization than 
welfare-maximizing public ownership of infrastructure?  We show below that the 
opposite is in fact the case.  We make the admittedly heroic assumption that 
production efficiency is independent of the regime, so that the same production 
functions can be used  in the two cases. 
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  As is well-known, a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for social 
optimality is a production equilibrium that maximizes Y, the value of output at world 
prices, since this enables the economy to climb onto its highest consumption 
possibility locus.  Y is affected by increased provision of I through its impact on 
outputs in agriculture and manufacturing. 
dY/dI = pdM/dI + dA/dI. 
Agricultural output is impaired by the withdrawal of labour into infrastructural and 
manufacturing employment. 
dA/dLa
 = αLaα – 1 = αA/La
The manufacturing output effect is an average of the proportionate changes in I and 
manufacturing employment, weighted by their relative output shares.   
dM/M = (qI/pM) dI/I + (wLm/pM) dLm/Lm. 
Manufacturing employment, in turn, is subject to two forces:  the growth in I  
accompanied by a proportionate rise in manufacturing labor demand (if wages were 
unchanged) and the rise in wages that induces a fall in the labor-infrastructure ratio. 
dLm/ Lm  = [1 – {1/(1 – β)}(dw/dI)I/w] dI/I 
Meanwhile, infrastructural employment rises with elasticity 1/δ as I increases and 
agricultural employment falls (with elasticity –1/(1–α)) as wages rise. 
IdLi/dI = Li/δ. 
wdLa/dw = - La/(1 –α) 
 Wages rise just enough to equilibriate the labour market (through an induced 
restriction of agricultural employment) in the face of the rise in labor demand from 
the infrastructure and manufacturing sectors.   
{La/(1 – α)} (dw/dI) I/w = Li/δ + Lm[1 – {1/(1 – β)}(dw/dI)I/w] 
from which 
dw/w = ( / )(1 )(1 ) /
(1 ) (1 )
i m
a m
L L dI I
L L
δ α β
β α
+ − −
− + −  
  
It is now a matter of simple substitutions to work out the changes in manufacturing 
and agricultural employment and therefore in manufacturing and agricultural output 
that follow a change in infrastructure.  The impact on national income can then be 
worked out as follows: 
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dY/dI = 
(1 ) (1 ){(1 ) }
{ (1 ) (1 ) }
(1 ) (1 )
i
a m
a m
LL pM L pM
pM A
L L
β βδ β α α β
β α
− − + − − −− + −
− + −
Aα α
 
Simplification of the numerator shows that dY/dI ≥ 0 as Lm(1 – β)/β ≥ Li/δ.  Given 
the fact that (1 – β)/β = qI/wLm , this reduces to the condition qI ≥ wLi/δ. 
 
A necessary condition for the maximization of national income (which is a 
necessary condition for social optimality) is qI = wLi/δ < wLi.  The infrastructure 
sector will be making losses in this situation.  Further, if qI > wLi, so that the 
infrastructure industry can at least cover its variable cost, dY/dI > 0:  social 
optimality will require an expansion of infrastructural output till losses are made.  
Obviously, therefore, the Stackelberg (or any free-market) equilibrium will imply a 
smaller infrastructural output and a lower degree of industrialization than social 
welfare-maximising  state ownership of infrastructure.  We repeat that this conclusion 
requires our implausible assumption that efficiency levels are independent of the 
ownership pattern. 
 
7. Contestable Cournot Oligopoly in Infrastructure 
 
A question of some importance relates to the sensitivity of our results to our 
assumption that infrastructure is provided by a monopolist.  While natural monopoly 
is typical of many major elements of infrastructure, an alternative market 
specification which has been frequently used is that of Cournot oligopoly with free 
entry.  In this section, we assume n identical infrastructure firms playing a Cournot 
game. With the inverse demand function of the infrastructure industry defined by (8), 
the marginal revenue of each Cournot firm is (1- β /n)q, while its marginal cost is 
1/ 1( / )w I n δδ
−  (where I/n is its output). The equation of marginal revenue and marginal 
cost then implies 
1 1/ 1 1/
(1 / )n w
n qIδ δ
δ β
−
− = −                                                      (37) 
                    = 1 1/(1 ) m
I
L I δ
β
β −−                                                              (38) 
from which 
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1/ 1 1/
(1 )(1 / )m
I nL
n
δ δβ
δ β β
−
= − −                                                                        (39). 
 
Labor in the infrastructure is related to I: 
1/ 1 1/ 1/( / ) ( / )i iL n L n n I n n I
δ δ δ−= = =                                                     (40) 
From (39) and (40), 
1 1/ 1/{1 / (1 )(1 / )}i mL L n n I
δ δβ δ β β −+ = + − −                                        (41) 
Now, inserting the expression (31) for  in the manufacturing production function, mL
1 1/
/{
(1 )(1 / )
n }M I
n
β
β σ δβ
δ β β
−
= − −                                                    (42) 
Manipulation of (41) and (42) yields 
(1 )
( 1)(1 )
{ (1 )(1 / )} ( )
{ (1 )(1 / ) }
i mn L LM
n n
β δ β σ
σ δ β
β δ β β
δ β β β
−
− −
− − += − − +                                         (43) 
 
 
n is endogenously determined. Free entry into the infrastructure industry 
reduces excess profits to zero. Now the marginal revenue/average revenue ratio is 
(1 / )nβ−  and the marginal cost/average cost ratio 1/δ  : zero profits (a.r. = a.c.) 
imply that the former ratio is equal to the latter: 
 
1 / 1/nβ δ− =                                                                                         (44). 
Thus, 
/( 1)n βδ δ= −                                                            (45). 
Insertion of the value of n in (43) yields 
(1 ) ( 1)(1 )(1/ 1) (1 1/ ) ( )i mM L L
δ β δ ββ δ β− − −= − − + σ
( 1)(1 )(1/ 1) 1/ ) ( )i mM L L
(1 ) (1δ β δ β σβ δ β− − −= − − +                          (46). 
Then, using (7), (39), (45) and (46), we derive 
p = 
( 1 ) /
(1 ) / 1 1/ 1 1/(1 ) (1 1/ )
w
M
σ β σ
β σ σ
β
β δ
− −
− −− − σ−                          (47) 
 
(47) is identical with (18), apart from a scalar transformation. Thus 
qualitatively, the shapes of the supply curves of manufactures under infrastructure 
monopoly and free-entry infrastructure Cournot oligopoly are identical. Equations 
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(and inequalities) (19) to (23a) hold without any change under Cournot oligopoly - 
and the geometric analysis above can therefore be repeated.  Our conclusions 
regarding multiple equilibria under infrastructure monopoly are replicated where 
infrastructure is provided by Cournot oligopolists in a contestable market.  The 
“naivete” assumption in the previous part of the paper is maintained for this analysis 
– the oligopolists do not take into account their possible impact on manufacturers’ 
employment decisions, or on the wage. 
If integer constraints are considered, the equations (45)-(47) will be replaced 
by inequalities setting upper and lower bounds to n, M and p. The algebra becomes 
infinitely more cumbrous without changing the qualitative characteristics of the 
system. 
 
 
8. Some Implications  
 
How do the size of the labor force and the elasticity of labor-supply to the 
industrial sector affect this model? As inequality (20) indicates, the larger is α , the 
higher must the share of industry in the total labour force rise before increasing 
returns in manufacturing are exhausted. α , on the other hand, is positively related to 
the elasticity of the demand for labor in agriculture and therefore to the elasticity of 
labour supply to industry (as shown by the wage equation (20)). The larger the total 
labour force L, the larger will be the absolute size of total industrial employment for 
any given share of industry in total labor. Thus, a large volume and elasticity of labor 
supply increase the likelihood of an autarky equilibrium with unexhausted economies 
of scale in industry and the possibility of asymmetric trading equilibria. Industrial 
growth prospects a la Arthur Lewis open up for densely populated agrarian 
economies with highly elastic labor supply in manufacturing - if international trade 
provides an outlet for their manufactures. This, of course, is the story of much of East 
Asian growth, of the development over the past four decades of Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Indonesia, China and now Vietnam. Unlike Lewis, however, we do not 
have to assume zero marginal labor product or surplus labor in agriculture: indeed, 
the agricultural production function that would favour this result most strongly is one 
that is near-linear in labor. 
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A major implication of the analysis is that the extent of the infrastructure 
provider’s sophistication in decision-making (whether he acts as a Level-1 player in a 
C-H model, or as a Stackelberg monopolist in an equilibrium model) drastically 
affects the equilibrium outcome and the extent of industrialization that a small open 
economy can achieve.  We have argued that while the closed economy equilibrium is 
unique – itself a departure from most papers on the theme of increasing returns in 
trade – multiple equilibria with different patterns and magnitudes of trade are possible 
when the economy opens up, if the infrastructure provider is naïve.  If he is 
sophisticated, however, a unique equilibrium emerges even in an open economy, 
involving a greater degree of industrialization than any of the “naïve” equilibria, as 
long as the initial size of the non-agricultural sector relative to the agricultural sector 
was below a threshold – which might well be the case in most poor economies.  We 
have pointed out how economies with similar underlying parameters may diverge if 
infrastructure providers in some, though not necessarily all, of these countries behave 
in a naïve manner.  With naïve behavior, it is possible that opening up an economy 
will lead to a lower degree of industrialization than under autarky – a 
deindustrialization without Dutch disease.  However, this will not happen with a 
sophisticated infrastructure provider.  It is possible, of course, that parameters are 
such that infrastructure providers cannot make profits so that the economy remains 
purely agrarian – but this does not happen as a result of opening up. 
 
To sum up, if international trade in manufactures is indeed opened up, the 
prospects of rapid industrialization through the market depend on the beliefs and 
model of reasoning of the infrastructure monopolist.  Our model focuses sharply on 
the key role of the entrepreneur in economic development – the role so dramatically, 
if informally, expounded by Schumpeter.  We provide an interpretation of the 
distinctive function of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur in terms of the theory of 
cognitive hierarchies. 
 
However, the possibility of multiple equilibria also widens the role that 
government may play in industrial policy.  This might become important if agents 
indeed tend to use less complex reasoning than most equilibrium models suggest.  
Expansion of the infrastructure sector, through entrepreneurial initiative – if 
entrepreneurs are sufficiently sophisticated in their reasoning - or otherwise because 
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of government ownership or because of government persuasion4 of less adventurous 
entrepreneurs, could be crucial in catalyzing industrial growth and the realization of 
economies of scale. As we have already shown, such expansion would justify itself in 
terms of higher profits.  The present model is static, of course, and does not depict 
irreversible growth processes.  It would be simple however to lock history into the 
production function for manufactures by adding a multiplicative productivity 
parameter that grows with manufactured output through learning-by-doing. Could 
this be the secret of the success of East Asian governments in nudging their 
industrialists down the path of industrial export growth, a path that led directly to the 
East Asian miracle? 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: We prove that one and only one equilibrium exists in 
the closed economy. 
 
 As M → 0, La → L and 
Mψ(M) = w M1/σ /τ → α Lα – 1M1/σ/τ → 0 
Now M/θ(M) = M (M)
{M (M) + L  - }Aα
ψ
μ ψ  
→
M (M)
{M (M) + L  - }Aα
ψ
μ ψ  = 0. 
  
Thus for small M, θ(M) > M. 
M assumes its maximum value Mmax when agricultural employment dwindles to zero.  
At this limit, θ(M) = μM < M. 
Since θ(M), a continuous function, passes from values greater than M to values less 
than it as M increases from 0 to Mmax, it must have a fixed point. 
Now, differentiation and some manipulation show that 
Mθ’(M) = μM[1 – {1 (1 ) / }A Aλτ αασ
− − + 1/(1 1/ )( )A AwM σ
τ σ− − ] 
while θ(M) can be written as  
θ(M) = μM+μ[τM1-1/σ (A- Ā)/w]      (using (18) and (23)) 
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Comparing the expressions for Mθ’(M) with that for θ(M) we see that the first term 
μM is common to both and the second term in  θ(M) exceeds the sum of the second 
and third terms in Mθ’(M) :as 
σ>0, 1-1/σ <1 
so 
μM[τ(A – Ā)/wM1/σ ] > μM[ 1/
(1 1/ )( )A A
wM σ
τ σ− −  ] 
                          > μM[ 1/
(1 1/ )( )A A
wM σ
τ σ− −   - {1 (1 ) / }A Aλτ αασ
− − ] 
or               Mθ’(M) <  θ(M) 
Thus,  d ln θ/ d ln M < 1. 
 If θ(M*) = M* is a closed economy equilibrium, we have, for any M > M*, 
M*∫Md ln θ < M*∫Md ln M 
Or ln θ(M) – ln θ(M*) < ln M – ln M* 
Or θ(M) < M for all M >M*. 
Similarly, we can prove that θ(M) > M for all M < M*. 
Thus, the closed economy equilibrium is unique. 
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Notes
                                                          
1Experimental evidence indicates that most agents are either “Level 1” or “Level 2”, with a slight 
dominance of the “Level 1” types (Crawford and Iriberri, 2005). 
2In a later section we consider the case of Cournot oligopoly in infrastructural provision. 
3This is reminiscent of the role of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur. 
4It is possible that the government may play a “co-ordinating” role persuading naïve infrastructure 
providers to choose the most highly industrialized of the “naïve equilibria”. However, this attributes a 
high degree of foresight to the government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 27
                                                                                                                                                                      
References 
 
Arrow, K. and M. Kurz (1970), “ Public investment, the rate of return and optimal 
fiscal policy.”  Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
Barro, R. (1990), “ Government spending in a simple model of  endogenous growth”,  
Journal of Political Economy, 98(5) : S103—S125.   
Camerer, C, T.H. Ho and J.K Chong (2004), “ A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of 
Games”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(3) : 861-898. 
Crawford, Vincent P. and M.A Costa Jones (2004), “Cognition and Behavior in Two-
Person Guessing Games : an Experimental Study”, UCSD, mimeo. 
Crawford, Vincent P and Nagore Iriberri (2005), “Fatal Attraction : Focality, Naivete 
and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games”, UCSD, mimeo.   
Ethier, W. J.  (1982), “ National and international returns to scale in the modern  
theory of international trade”, American Economic Review, 72: 389-405. 
Guha, Ashok (1981), “ An Evolutionary View of Economic Growth.” Clarendon 
Press, Oxford. 
Herberg, H. and M.C.Kemp (1969), “ Some implications of variable returns to scale” 
,  Canadian Journal of Economics,  2:  403-15. 
Krugman, Paul (1991), “ Increasing returns and economic geography”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 99: 483-499.  
Martin, P. and C. A. Rogers (1995), “Industrial location and Public Infrastructure”,  
Journal of International Economics , 39:  335-351. 
Matthews, R. C. O.  (1950), “ Reciprocal demand and increasing returns”,    Review 
of Economic Studies ,  17: 149-58.  
 28
                                                                                                                                                                      
Murphy, K., A. Schleifer and R. Vishny (1989), “Industrialization and the big push”,  
Journal of Political Economy ,  97:  1003-1025. 
Okuno-Fujiwara, M (1988), “Interdependence of industries, Co-ordination Failure 
and Strategic Promotion of an Industry”, Journal of International Economics, 25 : 25-
43. 
Panagariya, Arvind  (1981), “ Variable returns to scale in production and patterns of 
specialization”,  American Economic Review ,  71:  221-30. 
Puga, Diego and Anthony Venables (1999), “Agglomeration and economic 
development: import substitution vs. trade liberalization”, Economic Journal, 
109(455): 292-311. 
Rodriguez – Clare, A. (1996), “The division of labor and economic development”,  
Journal of Development Economics , 49: 3-32. 
 Rosenstein Rodan, P. N. (1943), “Problems of industrialization of East and Southeast 
Europe”,  Economic Journal , 53:  202 – 211. 
Venables,A.J.(1996), “Trade policy,cumulative causation and economic 
development”,  Journal of Development Economics,  49:  179 – 197. 
Young, Allyn A.  (1928), “ Increasing returns and economic progress”,  
EconomicJournal,38: 527—542. 
 
 29
Fig. 1ψ(M)
M
Θ(M)
U
U
U
P
T
U
Q
N
E
GGG I
O
V W Z
45`
M
•Fig. 2
ψ(M)
M
Θ(M)
Q
N
P
U
T
U
45`
HE F
O
V X Z
M
